TG-ATTC
TrustGate - Signal Attestation Catalog
Canonical Trust Attestation Specification
Part 1 — Foundation
Foundation, principles, architecture, and canonical concepts for the TrustGate Attestation Catalog and the TG-ATTEST trust attestation model.
1. Purpose
The TrustGate Attestation Catalog defines the canonical model for trust attestations within the ZAYAZ platform.
A Trust Attestation represents a signed, immutable, replayable assertion that a specific computational result has been independently evaluated and formally attested.
Unlike validation results, which describe the outcome of execution, attestations represent governed trust assertions that may be exchanged between organisations, archived for long-term assurance, anchored in the Distributed Assurance Ledger (DAL), and propagated through federated trust networks.
The catalog establishes:
- canonical attestation artifacts;
- attestation identity;
- attestation lifecycle;
- attestation governance;
- replay compatibility;
- federation interoperability;
- explainability requirements.
This specification serves as the constitutional foundation for all TrustGate attestations.
2. Architectural Position
The TrustGate Attestation Catalog occupies the assurance layer above validation.
Canonical Signal
↓
Validation Rule
↓
Validation Execution
↓
Validation Result (TG-VRES)
↓
Validation Evidence (TG-VEVID)
↓
Trust Attestation (TG-ATTEST)
↓
Trust Object (TO)
↓
Trust Vector (TV)
↓
Trust Intelligence (TG-INTEL)
Attestations therefore certify validation outcomes rather than replacing them.
3. What is a Trust Attestation?
A Trust Attestation is an immutable computational artifact that formally certifies one or more validation outcomes.
An attestation does not execute validation.
It certifies that validation has already occurred under governed conditions.
Every Trust Attestation is:
- immutable;
- explainable;
- replayable;
- cryptographically signed;
- independently verifiable;
- globally identifiable.
4. Separation of Responsibilities
TrustGate distinguishes between validation, evidence and attestation.
| Artifact | Responsibility |
|---|---|
| TG-VRES | Describes the validation result |
| TG-VEVID | Contains supporting evidence |
| TG-ATTEST | Certifies the result |
| TO | Maintains trust state |
| TV | Aggregates trust dimensions |
| TG-INTEL | Produces operational intelligence |
Each artifact fulfils a unique architectural responsibility.
5. Canonical Trust Attestation
The canonical attestation artifact is named:
TG-ATTEST
TG-ATTEST represents a governed trust assertion that references one or more validation artifacts while preserving complete computational lineage.
A TG-ATTEST may reference:
- TG-VRES;
- TG-VEVID;
- VRID;
- TG-VAL;
- CSI;
- CMID;
- USO;
- Trust Objects;
- Trust Vectors.
6. Trust Attestation Identifier (TAID)
Every Trust Attestation shall possess a globally unique immutable identifier.
The canonical identifier is:
TAID
Example:
TAID-ZYZ-000000000001
The TAID permanently identifies the attestation regardless of storage location, federation, replay, or archival.
Identifiers shall never be reused.
7. Relationship to the Canonical Identifier Architecture
The TrustGate Attestation model extends the Canonical Identifier Architecture (CIA).
| Layer | Identifier |
|---|---|
| Runtime Signal | USO |
| Canonical Signal | CSI |
| Producing Artifact | CMI |
| Metric | CMID |
| Validation Rule | TG-VAL |
| Validation Runtime | VRID |
| Validation Result | TG-VRES |
| Validation Evidence | TG-VEVID |
| Trust Attestation | TAID |
| Trust Object | TOID |
| Trust Vector | TVID |
| Trust Intelligence | TG-INTEL |
The addition of TAID completes the canonical identity model for governed assurance artifacts.
8. Trust Attestation Principles
The TrustGate Attestation Catalog is governed by the following constitutional principles.
- Attestations certify rather than execute.
- Attestations remain immutable.
- Attestations preserve replay.
- Attestations preserve explainability.
- Attestations never modify validation results.
- Attestations retain complete lineage.
- Attestations remain independently verifiable.
- Attestations may participate in federation.
These principles are normative.
9. Trust Attestation Scope
A Trust Attestation may certify:
- validation outcomes;
- computational integrity;
- replay verification;
- policy compliance;
- federation acceptance;
- verifier approval;
- assurance milestones;
- governance decisions.
Future attestation types shall remain compatible with this specification.
10. Relationship to E-C-O™
Trust Attestations are exchanged on behalf of E-C-O™ entities (also called ECOs).
An E-C-O Entity is a legally identifiable organisation represented by a globally unique E-C-O™ Number.
Examples include:
- companies;
- municipalities;
- government agencies;
- universities;
- NGOs;
- certification bodies.
Attestations certify activities associated with these entities.
11. Federation Context
Trust Attestations may be exchanged between independent ZAYAZ Domains.
A ZAYAZ Domain represents an operational deployment responsible for one or more E-C-O Entities.
Federation therefore occurs:
E-C-O Entity
↓
ZAYAZ Domain
↓
TrustGate
↓
EGFS Federation
↓
Receiving ZAYAZ Domain
↓
Receiving E-C-O Entity
This separation preserves organisational identity independently of infrastructure.
12. Explainability
Every Trust Attestation shall expose complete explainability.
Explainability includes:
- originating validation;
- supporting evidence;
- applicable validation rules;
- trust contributions;
- replay references;
- federation context;
- governance approvals.
No attestation shall exist without explainability.
13. Architectural Relationships
The TrustGate Attestation Catalog integrates directly with:
| Component | Relationship |
|---|---|
| Validation Rule Registry | Validation governance |
| Replay Specification | Deterministic replay |
| Trust Model | Trust computation |
| Federation Profiles | Cross-domain exchange |
| DAL | Long-term anchoring |
| Canonical Identifier Architecture | Identity governance |
| Canonical Invariant Registry | Constitutional constraints |
| DSAIL | AI-assisted assurance analysis |
14. Summary
The TrustGate Attestation Catalog establishes the constitutional foundation for immutable trust attestations within the ZAYAZ platform.
By introducing the canonical TG-ATTEST artifact and the globally unique TAID (Trust Attestation Identifier), the specification completes the assurance lifecycle between validation, trust computation, federation, and long-term governance.
Trust Attestations become the canonical mechanism for certifying computational outcomes, enabling independent verification, deterministic replay, cross-domain trust exchange, and explainable assurance while preserving the integrity, lineage, and constitutional principles of the ZAYAZ platform.
Part 2 — Canonical Attestation Model
Canonical attestation model, artifact structure, lifecycle, identifiers, and relationships for TrustGate attestations.
15. Purpose
The Canonical Attestation Model defines the normative structure of TrustGate attestations.
It specifies the constitutional representation of a Trust Attestation independently of storage technology, transport protocol, implementation language, or federation mechanism.
The model ensures that every attestation remains deterministic, immutable, replayable, explainable, and globally identifiable.
16. Canonical Trust Artifact
The canonical Trust Attestation artifact is:
TG-ATTEST
A TG-ATTEST represents a governed assurance assertion regarding one or more computational outcomes.
It does not replace validation.
It certifies validation.
17. Trust Attestation Identifier
Every attestation possesses a unique:
TAID — Trust Attestation Identifier
Example:
TAID-ZYZ-000000000001
TAIDs shall:
- be globally unique;
- remain immutable;
- never be reused;
- survive federation;
- survive replay;
- survive archival.
18. Canonical Structure
Every TG-ATTEST consists of the following logical sections.
Identity
↓
Subject
↓
Evidence
↓
Validation
↓
Trust
↓
Governance
↓
Signature
↓
Lineage
Each section contributes to the constitutional completeness of the attestation.
19. Identity
The Identity section defines the attestation itself.
Typical fields include:
| Field | Purpose |
|---|---|
| TAID | Attestation identifier |
| Version | Schema version |
| Created Timestamp | Publication time |
| Publisher | Issuing authority |
| Status | Lifecycle state |
Identity remains immutable after publication.
20. Subject
The Subject identifies what is being attested.
Examples include:
- signal;
- metric;
- report;
- policy;
- computational artifact;
- ESG disclosure;
- replay result.
Every subject shall possess canonical identifiers.
21. Validation References
A TG-ATTEST references the validation artifacts upon which it is based.
These may include:
- TG-VAL;
- VRID;
- TG-VRES;
- TG-VEVID.
Attestations shall never duplicate validation data.
They reference canonical artifacts.
22. Trust References
Trust relationships may include:
- TOID;
- TVID;
- Trust State;
- Trust Status;
- Trust Operational Flags.
Trust computation remains external to the attestation.
23. CIA Relationships
Every attestation preserves its Canonical Identifier Architecture (CIA) lineage.
Typical relationships include:
| Identifier | Purpose |
|---|---|
| CMID | Metric identity |
| CSI | Canonical signal definition |
| CMI | Producing component |
| USO | Runtime signal instance |
| VRID | Validation execution |
| TAID | Trust attestation |
Together these identifiers establish complete computational lineage.
24. Evidence Relationships
Evidence referenced by an attestation remains external.
Examples include:
- evidence packages;
- uploaded documents;
- sensor observations;
- supplier declarations;
- digital signatures;
- replay artifacts.
Evidence is referenced rather than embedded.
25. Signature Model
Every production attestation shall contain a cryptographic signature.
The signature protects:
- integrity;
- authenticity;
- non-repudiation.
Signature mechanisms are specified separately in the Cryptographic Trust Model.
26. Explainability
Every attestation shall expose explainability.
Explainability includes:
- validation references;
- evidence references;
- applicable rules;
- governance decisions;
- replay references;
- trust contribution.
No opaque attestation is permitted.
27. Immutability
Published attestations are immutable.
Permitted actions include:
- publish;
- supersede;
- revoke;
- archive.
Modification is prohibited.
28. Canonical Relationships
The canonical relationship graph is:
CMID
│
▼
CSI
│
▼
USO
│
▼
VRID
│
▼
TG-VRES
│
▼
TG-VEVID
│
▼
TG-ATTEST
│
▼
TOID
│
▼
TVID
│
▼
TG-INTEL
This graph preserves deterministic lineage from metric definition to trust intelligence.
29. Constitutional Principles
The Canonical Attestation Model is governed by the following principles.
- Attestations certify rather than compute.
- Attestations remain immutable.
- Attestations preserve complete lineage.
- Attestations remain replayable.
- Attestations remain explainable.
- Attestations reference canonical artifacts.
- Attestations remain independently verifiable.
- Attestations participate in federation without altering their identity.
These principles are normative.
30. Relationship to the ZAYAZ Architecture
The Canonical Attestation Model integrates directly with:
| Component | Relationship |
|---|---|
| Canonical Identifier Architecture (CIA) | Identity and lineage |
| TrustGate Validation Rule Registry | Validation source |
| TrustGate Trust Model | Trust computation |
| TrustGate Replay Specification | Replay verification |
| Canonical Invariant Registry (CIR) | Constitutional constraints |
| Distributed Assurance Ledger (DAL) | Long-term anchoring |
| EGFS Federation Specification | Cross-domain exchange |
| DSAIL | AI-assisted assurance |
31. Summary
The Canonical Attestation Model establishes the normative structure of TrustGate attestations.
By introducing a canonical identity (TAID), preserving complete computational lineage through the Canonical Identifier Architecture, and maintaining strict separation between validation, evidence, trust, and governance, the model provides the foundation for interoperable, replayable, cryptographically verifiable, and explainable assurance across federated ZAYAZ ecosystems.
Part 3 — Attestation Types & Taxonomy
Canonical taxonomy, classification model, and semantic structure for TrustGate attestations (TG-ATTEST).
32. Purpose
The TrustGate Attestation Taxonomy defines the canonical semantic classification of Trust Attestations (TG-ATTEST).
Rather than treating all attestations as equivalent, the taxonomy categorises attestations according to their purpose, scope, authority, and assurance level.
This enables:
- deterministic interpretation;
- federation interoperability;
- replay compatibility;
- explainable trust;
- future extensibility.
The taxonomy is normative.
33. Architectural Principles
Every Trust Attestation shall belong to exactly one canonical attestation type.
Additional classifications may be applied through metadata, but the primary attestation type remains immutable throughout the attestation lifecycle.
34. Canonical Taxonomy
The first version of the canonical taxonomy consists of the following top-level attestation classes.
| Code | Attestation Type | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| ATT-VAL | Validation Attestation | Certifies one or more validation outcomes |
| ATT-REP | Replay Attestation | Certifies successful deterministic replay |
| ATT-EVD | Evidence Attestation | Certifies the integrity and completeness of evidence |
| ATT-POL | Policy Attestation | Certifies policy compliance |
| ATT-TRUST | Trust Attestation | Certifies trust state or trust computation |
| ATT-GOV | Governance Attestation | Certifies governance approval or constitutional decisions |
| ATT-FED | Federation Attestation | Certifies cross-domain exchange and federation acceptance |
| ATT-DAL | Ledger Attestation | Certifies successful anchoring in the Distributed Assurance Ledger |
| ATT-AI | AI Attestation | Certifies AI-generated recommendations or intelligence under governance |
Future attestation classes shall preserve backward compatibility.
35. Validation Attestations (ATT-VAL)
Validation Attestations certify that one or more validation rules have executed successfully under governed conditions.
Typical references include:
- TG-VAL
- VRID
- TG-VRES
- TG-VEVID
Validation Attestations are the most common attestation type.
36. Replay Attestations (ATT-REP)
Replay Attestations certify that a historical execution has been reproduced deterministically.
They typically reference:
- Replay Session
- Replay Profile
- VRID
- TG-VRES
- USO
- CSI
Replay Attestations provide long-term assurance that historical computations remain reproducible.
37. Evidence Attestations (ATT-EVD)
Evidence Attestations certify that an evidence package satisfies integrity and completeness requirements.
Typical subjects include:
- uploaded documentation;
- supplier declarations;
- invoices;
- certificates;
- sensor observations;
- external datasets.
Evidence Attestations do not certify the underlying business claim—only the integrity of the evidence.
38. Policy Attestations (ATT-POL)
Policy Attestations certify compliance with one or more canonical policies.
Examples include:
- ESG policies;
- regulatory requirements;
- internal governance rules;
- certification schemes.
Policy Attestations reference the governing policy definitions rather than duplicating them.
39. Trust Attestations (ATT-TRUST)
Trust Attestations certify computed trust states.
Typical references include:
- TOID;
- TVID;
- Trust Status;
- Trust Lifecycle State;
- Trust Operational Flags.
They provide formal assurance regarding trust evaluations.
40. Governance Attestations (ATT-GOV)
Governance Attestations certify decisions taken through approved governance processes.
Examples include:
- publication approval;
- validation approval;
- exception approval;
- constitutional review;
- manual override approval.
Governance Attestations establish organisational accountability.
41. Federation Attestations (ATT-FED)
Federation Attestations certify information exchanged between independent ZAYAZ Domains on behalf of E-C-O™ Entities.
Typical examples include:
- trust exchange;
- cross-domain validation;
- federation acceptance;
- verifier approval;
- assurance exchange.
Federation Attestations are exchanged using the EGFS Federation Specification.
42. Ledger Attestations (ATT-DAL)
Ledger Attestations certify successful anchoring within the Distributed Assurance Ledger (DAL).
Typical references include:
- anchor identifier;
- block reference;
- hash digest;
- timestamp;
- verification status.
Ledger Attestations provide immutable long-term assurance.
43. AI Attestations (ATT-AI)
AI Attestations certify AI-generated outputs that have undergone governance and approval.
Examples include:
- TG-INTEL recommendations;
- predictive analyses;
- anomaly detection;
- optimisation proposals.
AI Attestations never replace deterministic validation.
44. Attestation Authority
Every attestation identifies its issuing authority.
Authorities may include:
- TrustGate;
- independent verifier;
- accredited auditor;
- certification body;
- regulatory authority;
- federation authority;
- delegated governance authority.
Authority information shall remain immutable.
45. Attestation Subject
Every attestation shall identify its subject.
Examples include:
- metric;
- signal;
- report;
- organisation;
- validation;
- replay;
- policy;
- trust object;
- trust vector.
The subject shall be identified using canonical identifiers wherever applicable.
46. Assurance Level
Attestations may declare an assurance level.
Suggested canonical levels include:
| Level | Meaning |
|---|---|
| AL1 | Internal operational assurance |
| AL2 | Organisational assurance |
| AL3 | Independent verification |
| AL4 | Accredited certification |
| AL5 | Regulatory assurance |
Future assurance schemes may extend these levels.
47. Semantic Relationships
Attestation types participate in the canonical assurance graph.
Validation
↓
Evidence
↓
Attestation
↓
Trust
↓
Federation
↓
Intelligence
Each attestation contributes to the overall assurance chain without duplicating responsibilities.
48. Constitutional Principles
The TrustGate Attestation Taxonomy is governed by the following principles.
- Every attestation has exactly one primary type.
- Types remain immutable after publication.
- Types determine semantic interpretation.
- Types preserve replay compatibility.
- Types support federation interoperability.
- Types shall remain explainable.
- Types shall be versioned through governance.
These principles are normative.
49. Relationship to the ZAYAZ Architecture
The Attestation Taxonomy integrates with:
| Component | Relationship |
|---|---|
| TrustGate Validation Rule Registry | Validation outcomes |
| TrustGate Trust Model | Trust certification |
| TrustGate Replay Specification | Replay assurance |
| TrustGate Federation Profiles | Cross-domain exchange |
| Canonical Identifier Architecture (CIA) | Identity and lineage |
| Canonical Invariant Registry (CIR) | Constitutional constraints |
| Distributed Assurance Ledger (DAL) | Long-term integrity |
| DSAIL | AI-assisted assurance |
50. Summary
The TrustGate Attestation Taxonomy establishes a canonical semantic classification for Trust Attestations across the ZAYAZ platform.
By defining immutable attestation types, governed assurance levels, issuing authorities, and canonical relationships, the taxonomy enables deterministic interpretation, federation interoperability, replay fidelity, and long-term trust. Every TG-ATTEST can therefore be understood, verified, exchanged, and governed consistently across independent ZAYAZ Domains and E-C-O™ Entities.
Part 4 — Attestation Lifecycle
Canonical lifecycle, governance states, operational status, supersession, revocation, and retention model for TrustGate Attestations (TG-ATTEST).
51. Purpose
The Attestation Lifecycle defines the canonical governance model governing every TrustGate Attestation (TG-ATTEST) from creation through archival.
The lifecycle ensures that attestations remain:
- immutable;
- explainable;
- replayable;
- governed;
- independently verifiable.
Lifecycle management is independent of cryptographic implementation.
52. Architectural Principles
Every Trust Attestation follows a governed lifecycle.
The lifecycle:
- begins before publication;
- ends only when permanently archived;
- never permits modification of published content.
Published attestations remain immutable throughout their lifetime.
53. Lifecycle Overview
Draft
↓
Under Review
↓
Approved
↓
Published
↓
Operational
↓
Superseded (optional)
↓
Revoked (optional)
↓
Archived
Only one operational lifecycle state may exist at any time.
54. Lifecycle States
The canonical lifecycle states are:
| State | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Draft | Attestation is being prepared |
| Under Review | Governance review in progress |
| Approved | Approved for publication |
| Published | Immutable canonical artifact |
| Operational | Actively participates in assurance |
| Superseded | Replaced by a newer attestation |
| Revoked | Explicitly withdrawn |
| Archived | Historical preservation |
Lifecycle transitions shall be auditable.
55. Operational Status
Lifecycle shall be distinguished from operational status.
Suggested operational statuses include:
| Status | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Active | Valid for operational use |
| Suspended | Temporarily disabled |
| Restricted | Limited operational scope |
| Deprecated | Maintained for historical compatibility |
| Invalid | No longer trusted |
Status changes never modify published content.
56. Canonical Lifecycle Transitions
Permitted transitions include:
Draft
↓
Review
↓
Approved
↓
Published
↓
Operational
Operational
├──► Superseded
├──► Revoked
└──► Archived
Transitions outside this model require constitutional approval.
57. Publication
Publication creates the canonical TG-ATTEST.
Publication assigns:
- TAID;
- publication timestamp;
- issuer identity;
- canonical version;
- immutable lineage.
After publication, attestation content shall never change.
58. Supersession
Supersession occurs when a newer attestation replaces an existing one.
The original attestation remains:
- identifiable;
- replayable;
- explainable;
- auditable.
Supersession never deletes historical artifacts.
59. Revocation
Revocation indicates that an attestation shall no longer be relied upon.
Typical reasons include:
- governance error;
- compromised signing authority;
- incorrect evidence;
- fraudulent submission;
- regulatory withdrawal.
Revocation preserves the historical artifact while changing its operational validity.
60. Archival
Archived attestations remain available for:
- replay;
- audit;
- legal retention;
- historical analysis;
- trust lineage.
Archival shall preserve all canonical identifiers.
61. Versioning
Every TG-ATTEST shall declare:
- schema version;
- attestation version;
- publication version.
Version identifiers remain immutable after publication.
New versions require new TAIDs.
62. Lineage Preservation
Lifecycle operations shall preserve complete lineage.
Referenced artifacts include:
- TG-VAL;
- VRID;
- TG-VRES;
- TG-VEVID;
- TOID;
- TVID;
- CSI;
- CMID;
- USO.
Historical relationships shall remain intact.
63. Governance Events
Lifecycle transitions generate governance events.
Examples include:
- submitted for review;
- approved;
- published;
- superseded;
- revoked;
- archived.
Governance events are immutable operational records.
64. Retention
Retention policies shall preserve:
- canonical identifiers;
- signatures;
- governance metadata;
- replay compatibility;
- explainability.
Implementations may archive storage but shall not lose constitutional integrity.
65. Replay Compatibility
Every lifecycle transition shall remain replayable.
Replay shall reconstruct:
- lifecycle state;
- operational status;
- governance decisions;
- timestamps;
- issuer identity.
Historical replay shall reproduce the original attestation state at any point in time.
66. Federation Impact
Lifecycle changes may propagate to federated ZAYAZ Domains.
Examples include:
- publication;
- supersession;
- revocation.
Federation propagation policies are defined by the TrustGate Federation Profiles and EGFS Federation Specification.
67. Lifecycle Explainability
Every lifecycle transition shall expose:
- initiating authority;
- timestamp;
- reason;
- affected artifact;
- previous state;
- resulting state.
Explainability is mandatory.
68. Constitutional Principles
The Attestation Lifecycle is governed by the following principles.
- Published attestations are immutable.
- Lifecycle transitions are auditable.
- Revocation preserves history.
- Supersession never replaces historical artifacts.
- Archival preserves replay capability.
- Operational status is independent of lifecycle state.
- Every transition shall be explainable.
These principles are normative.
69. Relationship to the ZAYAZ Architecture
The Attestation Lifecycle integrates directly with:
| Component | Relationship |
|---|---|
| TrustGate Validation Rule Registry | Source validation artifacts |
| TrustGate Trust Model | Trust computation |
| TrustGate Replay Specification | Deterministic replay |
| TrustGate Federation Profiles | Cross-domain propagation |
| Canonical Identifier Architecture (CIA) | Identifier governance |
| Canonical Invariant Registry (CIR) | Lifecycle invariants |
| Distributed Assurance Ledger (DAL) | Long-term anchoring |
| DSAIL | AI-assisted lifecycle analysis |
70. Summary
The Attestation Lifecycle defines the constitutional governance model for TrustGate Attestations.
By separating lifecycle state from operational status, preserving immutable publication, supporting supersession and revocation without destroying historical evidence, and maintaining deterministic replay throughout the attestation lifetime, the lifecycle ensures that every TG-ATTEST remains trustworthy, explainable, and verifiable across the entire ZAYAZ ecosystem.
Part 5 — Cryptographic Trust Model
Canonical cryptographic model, digital signatures, integrity protection, algorithm agility, and verification requirements for TrustGate Attestations.
71. Purpose
The Cryptographic Trust Model defines the constitutional security requirements for TrustGate Attestations (TG-ATTEST).
Its purpose is to ensure that every published attestation remains:
- authentic;
- tamper-evident;
- independently verifiable;
- replayable;
- federation-ready;
- cryptographically future-proof.
The model specifies security principles rather than implementation-specific cryptographic algorithms.
72. Architectural Principles
Every Trust Attestation shall be protected through cryptographic integrity mechanisms.
The cryptographic model shall guarantee:
- authenticity;
- integrity;
- non-repudiation;
- traceability;
- long-term verifiability.
Cryptography protects the attestation—not the trust decision itself.
73. Cryptographic Layers
The TrustGate cryptographic architecture consists of multiple layers.
TG-ATTEST
↓
Canonical Serialization
↓
Hash Generation
↓
Digital Signature
↓
Certificate / Trust Chain
↓
Verification
↓
Replay Verification
↓
DAL Anchoring (optional)
Each layer contributes independently to assurance.
74. Canonical Serialization
Before signing, every TG-ATTEST shall be converted into a canonical representation.
Canonical serialization shall ensure:
- deterministic ordering;
- stable encoding;
- platform independence;
- replay compatibility.
Equivalent attestations shall always produce identical serialized representations.
75. Hash Generation
Every published attestation shall generate a cryptographic digest.
The digest protects:
- payload integrity;
- canonical references;
- metadata integrity.
Hash values remain immutable throughout the attestation lifecycle.
76. Digital Signatures
Every production attestation shall be digitally signed.
The signature shall provide:
- issuer authentication;
- integrity verification;
- non-repudiation.
Multiple signatures may be supported.
Examples include:
- issuing organisation;
- accredited verifier;
- federation authority;
- regulatory authority.
77. Signature Chains
TrustGate supports hierarchical signature chains.
Example:
TrustGate
↓
Internal Verifier
↓
Independent Auditor
↓
Certification Body
↓
Regulatory Authority
Each signature augments assurance without modifying the underlying attestation.
78. Verification Model
Verification shall confirm:
- signature validity;
- certificate validity;
- attestation integrity;
- identifier consistency;
- replay compatibility;
- lineage integrity.
Verification shall never modify the attestation.
79. Trust Anchors
Verification depends upon trusted cryptographic anchors.
Examples include:
- organisational trust anchors;
- certification authorities;
- federation trust anchors;
- regulatory trust anchors;
- sovereign trust anchors.
Trust anchors are governed independently of individual attestations.
80. Certificate Model
TrustGate does not mandate a specific certificate technology.
Implementations may use:
- X.509 certificates;
- decentralized identifiers (DIDs);
- verifiable credentials;
- sovereign trust infrastructures;
- future certificate models.
All certificate models shall expose equivalent verification semantics.
81. Algorithm Agility
No cryptographic algorithm is permanently mandated.
Implementations shall support algorithm agility.
Future migrations—including post-quantum cryptography—shall not invalidate existing attestations.
Algorithm identifiers shall therefore be stored as attestation metadata.
82. Multi-Signature Support
A Trust Attestation may contain multiple independent signatures.
Examples include:
- producer signature;
- verifier signature;
- certification signature;
- federation acceptance signature.
Each signature remains independently verifiable.
83. Federation Verification
Federated ZAYAZ Domains shall verify incoming attestations before acceptance.
Verification includes:
- signature validation;
- certificate validation;
- issuer validation;
- identifier validation;
- replay verification.
Failed verification shall prevent federation acceptance.
84. Replay Integrity
Replay shall reproduce the original cryptographic verification context.
Replay verification shall confirm:
- original digest;
- original signature;
- original certificate chain;
- original issuance metadata.
Replay shall demonstrate that the historical attestation remained valid at the time of issuance.
85. Long-Term Preservation
Cryptographic metadata shall be retained for the complete retention period.
Preserved information includes:
- digest;
- signature;
- algorithm identifier;
- certificate reference;
- issuance timestamp;
- verification status.
Historical verification shall remain possible after archival.
86. Distributed Assurance Ledger (DAL)
DAL anchoring provides an additional integrity guarantee.
Typical anchoring includes:
- attestation digest;
- TAID;
- timestamp;
- anchor identifier;
- verification proof.
DAL complements digital signatures but does not replace them.
87. Cryptographic Explainability
Every verification process shall expose explainability.
Explainability includes:
- signing authority;
- verification result;
- certificate chain;
- algorithm identifiers;
- integrity status;
- replay verification.
Cryptographic assurance shall be transparent.
88. Constitutional Principles
The Cryptographic Trust Model is governed by the following principles.
- Every production attestation shall be digitally signed.
- Signatures shall never modify attestation content.
- Verification shall be deterministic.
- Cryptographic algorithms shall remain replaceable.
- Historical verification shall remain possible.
- Replay shall preserve cryptographic integrity.
- Federation shall verify before acceptance.
- DAL anchoring augments but does not replace signatures.
These principles are normative.
89. Relationship to the ZAYAZ Architecture
The Cryptographic Trust Model integrates directly with:
| Component | Relationship |
|---|---|
| Canonical Identifier Architecture (CIA) | Identifier integrity |
| Canonical Invariant Registry (CIR) | Cryptographic invariants |
| Canonical Artifact Lifecycle Model (CALM) | Lifecycle governance |
| TrustGate Validation Rule Registry | Validation assurance |
| TrustGate Replay Specification | Replay verification |
| TrustGate Federation Profiles | Cross-domain verification |
| Distributed Assurance Ledger (DAL) | Immutable anchoring |
| EGFS Federation Specification | Federated trust exchange |
90. Summary
The Cryptographic Trust Model establishes the constitutional security foundation for TrustGate Attestations.
By combining deterministic serialization, cryptographic digests, digital signatures, trust anchors, verification chains, algorithm agility, replay compatibility, and optional Distributed Assurance Ledger anchoring, the model ensures that every TG-ATTEST remains authentic, tamper-evident, independently verifiable, and future-proof throughout its operational lifecycle.
The model deliberately remains technology-neutral, allowing cryptographic implementations to evolve while preserving the integrity, explainability, and long-term trustworthiness of canonical assurance artifacts.
Part 6 — Federation & Exchange
Canonical federation model, exchange architecture, trust propagation, delegation, synchronization, and interoperability for TrustGate Attestations.
91. Purpose
The Federation & Exchange model defines how TrustGate Attestations (TG-ATTEST) are exchanged between independent ZAYAZ Domains on behalf of E-C-O™ Entities.
Unlike validation artifacts, which remain primarily internal computational objects, Trust Attestations are designed to be portable assurance artifacts that may be exchanged, verified, replayed, and trusted across organizational boundaries.
This chapter defines the constitutional principles governing trust federation while remaining independent of any specific transport technology or federation protocol.
92. Architectural Principles
Trust federation is based upon immutable attestations rather than mutable trust state.
Federation therefore exchanges:
- trust assertions;
- assurance evidence;
- governance decisions;
- replayable lineage.
Federation never exchanges internal runtime state.
93. Federation Architecture
E-C-O Entity
│
▼
Local ZAYAZ Domain
│
▼
TrustGate
│
▼
TG-ATTEST
│
▼
EGFS Federation
│
▼
Receiving ZAYAZ Domain
│
▼
Receiving TrustGate
│
▼
Trust Object / Trust Vector
Trust is exchanged through attestations rather than direct database synchronization.
94. Federation Units
The canonical federation unit is:
TG-ATTEST
Supporting artifacts may accompany an attestation but do not replace it.
Examples include:
- TG-VRES;
- TG-VEVID;
- Replay references;
- DAL anchors;
- supporting evidence.
95. Federation Participants
Federation participants include:
- companies;
- suppliers;
- customers;
- certification bodies;
- auditors;
- regulators;
- governmental agencies;
- NGOs;
- verifier networks.
Every participant shall be represented by an E-C-O™ Entity.
96. ZAYAZ Domains
A ZAYAZ Domain represents an operational TrustGate environment responsible for one or more E-C-O™ Entities.
Domains remain operationally independent while participating in federation through governed trust exchange.
This separation enables:
- multi-tenancy;
- sovereign deployments;
- governmental infrastructures;
- enterprise ecosystems;
- verifier platforms.
97. Trust Exchange
Trust exchange consists of transferring one or more Trust Attestations between ZAYAZ Domains.
Exchange preserves:
- TAID;
- lineage;
- signatures;
- replay references;
- governance metadata.
Identifiers shall never be regenerated by the receiving domain.
98. Federation Verification
Before acceptance, every incoming attestation shall be verified.
Verification includes:
- identifier integrity;
- cryptographic signature validation;
- certificate validation;
- replay compatibility;
- constitutional invariant verification;
- issuer trustworthiness.
Verification failures shall prevent federation acceptance.
99. Trust Propagation
Accepted attestations may contribute to local trust computation.
Typical propagation includes:
- Trust Object updates;
- Trust Vector adjustments;
- Trust Intelligence generation;
- governance notifications.
Trust propagation is a local decision.
Attestations remain immutable.
100. Trust Delegation
TrustGate supports delegated trust.
Delegation permits an organization to recognize attestations issued by another trusted authority.
Examples include:
- accredited auditors;
- certification bodies;
- governmental authorities;
- independent verifier networks.
Delegation never transfers ownership of the attestation.
101. Federation Synchronization
Synchronization ensures participating domains maintain consistent assurance knowledge.
Synchronization may include:
- new attestations;
- superseded attestations;
- revoked attestations;
- governance updates.
Synchronization never modifies published artifacts.
102. Federation Revocation
Revocation information shall propagate throughout participating federation networks.
Receiving domains shall preserve:
- historical artifacts;
- replay capability;
- explainability.
Operational trust may be updated while historical evidence remains intact.
103. Cross-Domain Explainability
Every federated attestation shall expose complete explainability.
This includes:
- issuing authority;
- originating E-C-O™ Entity;
- originating ZAYAZ Domain;
- applicable validation rules;
- evidence references;
- replay references;
- trust contribution.
Receiving domains shall be capable of reconstructing the complete assurance lineage.
104. EGFS Integration
The EGFS Federation Specification defines the operational exchange mechanisms used to transport Trust Attestations.
The TrustGate Attestation Catalog defines:
- what is exchanged.
The EGFS Federation Specification defines:
- how it is exchanged.
This separation preserves architectural modularity.
105. Federation Policies
Federation behavior may be governed by configurable policies.
Examples include:
- accepted authorities;
- accepted assurance levels;
- jurisdiction restrictions;
- replay requirements;
- mandatory signatures;
- retention requirements.
Policies influence federation decisions without modifying exchanged artifacts.
106. Constitutional Principles
Federation & Exchange is governed by the following constitutional principles.
- Federation exchanges attestations rather than trust state.
- TAIDs remain globally immutable.
- Receiving domains shall verify before acceptance.
- Trust propagation remains a local decision.
- Revocation preserves historical lineage.
- Federation shall preserve replay compatibility.
- Explainability shall remain complete across domains.
- EGFS transports attestations but does not redefine them.
These principles are normative.
107. Relationship to the ZAYAZ Architecture
The Federation & Exchange model integrates directly with:
| Component | Relationship |
|---|---|
| TrustGate Federation Profiles | Federation behavior |
| EGFS Federation Specification | Transport and interoperability |
| TrustGate Validation Rule Registry | Validation provenance |
| TrustGate Trust Model | Trust computation |
| TrustGate Replay Specification | Replay assurance |
| Distributed Assurance Ledger (DAL) | Long-term integrity |
| Canonical Identifier Architecture (CIA) | Canonical identity |
| Canonical Invariant Registry (CIR) | Constitutional governance |
| Canonical Artifact Lifecycle Model (CALM) | Lifecycle consistency |
108. Summary
The Federation & Exchange model establishes the constitutional framework for exchanging TrustGate Attestations across federated ZAYAZ Domains.
By defining TG-ATTEST as the canonical unit of trust exchange, preserving immutable identifiers, ensuring deterministic verification, maintaining complete computational lineage, and separating organizational identity from deployment infrastructure, the model enables secure, replayable, explainable, and interoperable assurance across the global ZAYAZ ecosystem.
Part 7 — Replay & Assurance
Canonical replay model, deterministic assurance, lineage preservation, and long-term verification for TrustGate Attestations.
109. Purpose
The Replay & Assurance model defines how TrustGate Attestations (TG-ATTEST) participate in deterministic replay and long-term assurance.
Replay enables computational reproducibility.
Attestation enables computational trust.
Together they provide explainable, verifiable, and replayable assurance across the entire ZAYAZ ecosystem.
110. Architectural Principles
Replay and Attestation serve different constitutional responsibilities.
Replay demonstrates that historical computation can be reproduced.
Attestation certifies that the reproduced computation can be trusted.
Neither replaces the other.
111. Replay Architecture
The canonical replay chain is:
CMID
↓
CSI
↓
USO
↓
Validation Rules
↓
VRID
↓
TG-VRES
↓
TG-VEVID
↓
TG-ATTEST
↓
Replay Verification
Every layer contributes to deterministic assurance.
112. Deterministic Replay
A deterministic replay shall reproduce the original computational outcome when executed under equivalent governed conditions.
Replay shall preserve:
- computational lineage;
- execution order;
- validation outcomes;
- evidence references;
- attestation integrity.
Replay never regenerates historical identifiers.
113. Replay Scope
Replay may operate at different scopes.
Canonical replay scopes include:
| Scope | Description |
|---|---|
| Signal | Individual signal replay |
| Metric | Metric computation replay |
| Validation | Validation execution replay |
| Evidence | Evidence reconstruction |
| Attestation | Trust attestation verification |
| Report | Complete disclosure replay |
| Ecosystem | End-to-end organizational replay |
Replay scope shall be explicitly declared.
114. Attestation Verification During Replay
Replay verification shall confirm that the replayed computation corresponds to the original attested computation.
Verification includes:
- TAID consistency;
- signature verification;
- lineage verification;
- validation consistency;
- evidence integrity;
- replay completeness.
Replay does not create a new attestation.
115. Computational Lineage
Replay depends upon complete computational lineage.
Lineage shall preserve references to:
- CMID;
- CSI;
- CMI;
- USO;
- VRID;
- TG-VRES;
- TG-VEVID;
- TAID;
- TOID;
- TVID.
Missing lineage invalidates deterministic replay.
116. Replay Profiles
Replay behavior may be governed through Replay Profiles.
Typical replay profiles include:
- Full Replay;
- Validation Replay;
- Trust Replay;
- Regulatory Replay;
- Audit Replay;
- Federation Replay.
Replay Profiles are defined in the TrustGate Replay Specification.
117. Replay Evidence
Replay produces replay evidence demonstrating that historical computation has been successfully reconstructed.
Replay evidence may include:
- execution logs;
- comparison results;
- timing metadata;
- signature verification;
- integrity verification.
Replay evidence complements—but does not replace—the original evidence.
118. Assurance Chain
TrustGate establishes a continuous assurance chain.
Evidence
↓
Validation
↓
Attestation
↓
Replay
↓
Verification
↓
Trust
↓
Intelligence
Each layer strengthens confidence while preserving separation of responsibilities.
119. Replay Integrity
Replay shall verify:
- identical identifiers;
- identical lineage;
- identical validation results;
- identical attestation references;
- identical governance decisions.
Equivalent replay shall produce equivalent assurance.
120. Historical Assurance
Historical assurance enables verification of computations long after their original execution.
Historical assurance preserves:
- explainability;
- signatures;
- lineage;
- governance history;
- constitutional compliance.
Historical assurance remains valid regardless of infrastructure changes.
121. Federation Replay
Federated Trust Attestations shall remain replayable after exchange.
Receiving ZAYAZ Domains shall be capable of verifying:
- attestation integrity;
- computational lineage;
- federation metadata;
- signature validity;
- replay consistency.
Federation shall never compromise replay capability.
122. Replay Explainability
Replay shall expose complete explainability.
Explainability includes:
- original execution context;
- validation history;
- evidence references;
- attestation history;
- replay differences (if any);
- governance events.
Replay shall never become a black box.
123. Replay Failure
Replay failure shall never destroy historical artifacts.
Failures shall be classified and recorded.
Typical causes include:
- missing lineage;
- unavailable evidence;
- invalid signatures;
- governance inconsistencies;
- constitutional invariant violations.
Replay failures shall remain explainable.
124. Long-Term Assurance
Replay supports long-term assurance by demonstrating that historical computational outcomes remain independently verifiable.
Long-term assurance may support:
- regulatory investigations;
- financial audits;
- ESG assurance;
- legal proceedings;
- scientific reproducibility;
- certification reviews.
125. Constitutional Principles
Replay & Assurance is governed by the following constitutional principles.
- Replay demonstrates computation.
- Attestation demonstrates trust.
- Replay shall remain deterministic.
- Historical identifiers shall never change.
- Computational lineage shall remain complete.
- Replay shall preserve explainability.
- Replay failures shall remain auditable.
- Replay shall support long-term assurance.
These principles are normative.
126. Relationship to the ZAYAZ Architecture
The Replay & Assurance model integrates directly with:
| Component | Relationship |
|---|---|
| TrustGate Replay Specification | Replay execution |
| TrustGate Validation Rule Registry | Validation replay |
| TrustGate Trust Model | Trust verification |
| TrustGate Federation Profiles | Cross-domain replay |
| Canonical Identifier Architecture (CIA) | Identity preservation |
| Canonical Artifact Lifecycle Model (CALM) | Lifecycle reconstruction |
| Canonical Invariant Registry (CIR) | Constitutional replay invariants |
| Distributed Assurance Ledger (DAL) | Long-term integrity anchoring |
| DSAIL | AI-assisted replay analysis |
127. Summary
The Replay & Assurance model establishes the constitutional relationship between deterministic computation and trustworthy assurance within the ZAYAZ platform.
By preserving complete computational lineage, immutable identifiers, replay profiles, explainable verification, and long-term integrity, TrustGate ensures that every TG-ATTEST remains independently verifiable throughout its lifecycle.
Replay proves that a computation can be reproduced.
Attestation proves that the reproduced computation can be trusted.
Together they provide the foundation for transparent, auditable, and federated assurance across the global ZAYAZ ecosystem.